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The Background
Described  in  its  Long  Title  as  existing  “for  the  protection  of  consumers”  and, 
judicially,  in  Southern  Pacific  v  Walker1 as  having  been  passed  “to  protect 
consumers  of  credit,  an  aim  which  accounts  for  its  substantive  content  and 
conditions its judicial interpretation”,2 the 1974 Consumer Credit Act has been the 
focus  of  considerable  and,  arguably  unjustified,  criticism.3  Despite  this,  its  role 
remains central as financial products become ever more complex and consumerism 
more rampant, as recently acknowledged in Rankine v American Express Services  
Europe Limited,4  where H. H. Judge Simon Brown QC commented on the need for 
the  legislation  to  “protect  the  individual  unsophisticated  in  ﬁnancial  affairs  in 
contracts with unscrupulous and sophisticated ﬁnancial institutions”.5
A plethora of recent legislation has sought to underpin this overriding objective of 
consumer  protection.  In  addition  to  the  Consumer  Credit  Act  2006,  an  array  of 
delegated legislation  was  introduced to give effect to wide-ranging EU provisions,6 
and furthermore,  consumer credit-related regulated activity must now comply with 
the  FCA's  Consumer  Credit  Sourcebook  (or  “CONC”)  as  from  1  April  2014,  to 
coincide  with  the  transfer  of  consumer  credit  regulation  and  supervision  to  the 
Financial Conduct Authority.
In considering specific legislative examples to test the welfarist credentials of the Act, 
a key example would be the connected lender liability-based s75, which states:
“(1)  If  the  debtor  under  a  debtor-creditor-supplier  agreement  falling  within 
section  12(b)  or  (c)  has,  in  relation  to  a  transaction  financed  by  the 
agreement, any claim against the supplier in respect of a misrepresentation or 
breach of contract, he shall have a like claim against the creditor, who, with 
the supplier, shall accordingly be jointly and severally liable to the debtor.”
1* Senior Lecturer in Law, Middlesex University, Mauritius.
 Southern Pacific Personal Loans Ltd v Walker [2009] EWCA Civ 1218; [2010] 1 All E.R.  
(Comm) 854; [2010] Bus. L.R. 418.
2 Southern Pacific Personal Loans Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1218 at [23] per Mummery L.J. 
3 e.g. McGinn v Grangeworth Securities Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 522; Times, May 30, 2002;  
Independent, July 15, 2002 at [1] per Clarke L.J.
4 Rankine v American Express Services Europe Limited (2008) C.T.L.C. 195.
5 Rankine [2008] C.T.L.C. 195 at [9]. The Report of the Committee on Consumer Credit  
(Cmnd.1971) 4596 ("Crowther Committee Report"), the catalyst for the Consumer Credit 
Act 1974, stated that the main objective of the legislation was "to provide for the small 
individual borrower the protection he unquestionably needs" (at [6.6.3]–[6.4]).
6 Most  recently  the  Consumer  Credit  Directive  2008/48  on  credit  agreements  for 
consumers  and  repealing  Council  Directive  87/102  [2008]  OJ  L133/66,  effective  for 
consumer credit agreements made on or after February 1, 2011.
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This multifactorial provision firstly requires there to be a regulated “debtor-creditor-
supplier agreement”. Such will exist where there is a business connection between 
the creditor and supplier or, more specifically, an agreement intended “to finance a 
transaction between the debtor and a person (the “supplier”) other than the creditor”7 
and “made by the creditor under pre-existing arrangements…between himself and 
the supplier” 8 where the cash price is over £100 but not £30,000.9 So, an example of 
a s.75 arrangement would be a typical credit card transaction, where the credit card  
company will  have “arrangements” with a supplier (or retailer), whereby the latter 
agrees to accept the provider’s credit cards from customers as a mode of payment 
for the goods provided. Such tripartite relationships are known collectively as “three-
party”  debtor-creditor-supplier  agreements,10 and  also  include  loans  provided  to 
customers  to  facilitate  purchases  from  the  supplier,  where  arrangements  exist 
between lenders and suppliers, under which the former provides finance to facilitate 
purchases from the latter. Clearly, this provision will not apply to s.12 (a) “two-party” 
debtor-creditor-supplier  agreements  such  as  hire  purchase  of  conditional  sale 
agreements, where the lender and supplier are the same entity.
Section 75 imposes joint and several liability on the supplier and creditor. As such, a 
party who obtains faulty and/or wrongly described goods for example, could, on the 
basis of s.75, claim against the credit card company or the supplier where the latter 
is in breach of contract, provided such a claim complies with the six-year rule under  
s.5 Limitation Act 1980, which states that an action in contract “shall not be brought  
after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued”.  
Such a contractual breach, may relate to express or implied terms- typically s.14 
Sale of Goods Act 1979, and the requirement under s.14(2A) for goods to be of 
“satisfactory quality” or, more specifically, to “meet the standard that a reasonable 
person  would  regard  as  satisfactory,  taking  account  of  any…relevant 
circumstances”.  Significantly,  s.75(1)  will  also  apply  to  transactions  entered  into 
abroad by customers of UK card issuers,11 and those situations where only a deposit 
to the credit transaction is paid by credit card with the balance being settled with  
cash.  Additionally,  s.75  is  relevant  where  a  supplier  has  perpetrated  a 
misrepresentation as to the nature of the goods or credit agreement, whereupon the 
customer, again, may pursue a claim against the supplier and a “like claim” against 
the  creditor.  However,  what  is  meant  by  a  “like  claim”?  It  has  generally  been 
accepted that the customer is able to seek rescission against the supplier for that 
particular transaction whilst abstaining from making further payments to the creditor. 
7 Consumer Credit Act 1974 s.11(1)(b).
8 Consumer Credit Act 1974 s.12(b).
9 The new s.75A, introduced as part of implementation of the Consumer Credit Directive 
2008/48,  confers  protection  for  purchases  of  over  £30,000  in  certain  prescribed 
circumstances.
10 From April 1, 2014, such are described as ‘borrower-lender-supplier agreements’ by 
virtue of the Regulated Activities Order (SI 2013/188). 
11 Office of Fair Trading v Lloyds TSB Bank Plc [2007] UKHL 48; [2008] 1 A.C. 316; [2007]  
3 W.L.R. 733.
2
However,  the area of substantive confusion has been whether  (or not)  s.75 also 
conferred a right to rescind the credit agreement as well as the supply agreement? 
Judicial  attempts  to  answer  this  question  have  until  recently  been  rather 
unsatisfactory,  thereby  leading  to  considerable  academic  debate  and  conceptual 
ambiguity. For example, in United Dominions Trust v Taylor,12 the debtor rescinded a 
contract of sale for a car with a supplier and claimed to have “a like claim against the 
creditor” bank in respect of the loan provided for its purchase. It was held that the 
words “a like claim” were wide enough to include a claim for rescission of the loan 
contract,  even  though  the  creditor  had  not  been  responsible  for  any 
misrepresentation and/or breach of contract, Sheriff Principal Reid opining that
  “It  would be odd, to say the least, if the right to rescind was not available  
against the creditor and the right to restitution, which depends of rescission, 
was  available…The  section  does  not  require  that  the  claim  against  the 
creditor shall be justiciable on like grounds to the claim against the supplier, 
merely that is shall he the same sort of claim. The words ‘a like claim’ are thus 
wide enough to include a claim for rescission although the creditor has given 
no grounds for rescission of the loan contract.”13
Despite this view being adopted in the later case of Forward Trust Ltd v Hornsby,14 
there has been considerable critique of its “logic”15 and, indeed, such would seem to 
contradict  the original  intentions of  the Crowther  Committee,  which  anticipated a 
breach of s.75 rendering the creditor “answerable in damages…for breaches of any 
term of the agreement relating to title, fitness or quality of the goods” only.16
The Supreme Court
The matter would now appear to have been settled by the Supreme Court in Durkin v 
DSG Retail Limited,17 on appeal from the Scottish Inner House Court of Session18. In 
what is likely to become seen as a seminal authority on connected lender liability, the 
Supreme Court  has circumvented the  conceptual  difficulties  inherent  in  affording 
rescission of a s.12(b) credit agreement under s.75.
The facts of this case were that in December 1998, Mr Durkin entered into a s.12 (b) 
agreement for the purchase of a laptop computer from PC World. It was agreed that 
should the laptop not have a inbuilt modem, Mr Durkin could return the item to the 
12 United Dominions Trust v Taylor 1980 S.L.T. 18.
13 United Dominions Trust 1980 S.L.T. 18 at 30. 
14 Forward Trust Ltd v Hornsby 1995 S.C.L.R. 574; [1996] C.C.L.R. 18.
15 e.g. Davidson, "The Missing Link Transaction" (1980) 96 L.Q.R. 343; and Lowe, "Missing 
Link  Transactions—Further  Observations"  (1981)  97  L.Q.R.  532;  Guest  and  Lloyd, 
Encyclopaedia of Consumer Credit Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), p.2074/4.
16 The Report of the Committee on Consumer Credit (Cmnd.4596, 1971) at [6.6.26–27].
17 Durkin v DSG Retail Ltd [2014] UKSC 21; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 1148; [2014] 2 All E.R. 715. 
18 Durkin [2010] CSIH 49; 2010 S.C. 662; 2011 S.L.T. 114.
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store (the PC World policy was not to permit customers to remove a laptop from its 
box before purchase). Mr Durkin paid a £50 deposit, with the remaining balance of 
£1449 financed by a credit agreement with HFC. Within one day of purchase, and 
having identified that the laptop did not possess a modem for internet access, he 
attempted to return the laptop to the store and sought rescission of the sale  and 
credit agreement.  
The store manager refused to accept Mr Durkin’s rejection of the laptop and failed to 
act to assist in the cancellation of the credit agreement which soon accumulated 
considerable arrears, with Mr Durkin having refused to make payments as they fell 
due. In addition to the arrears, HFC had registered numerous adverse entries on 
credit  registers  which  had  prevented  the  latter  from  obtaining  low  rate  finance 
elsewhere. With this in mind, Mr Durkin issued an action for declaratory relief against 
DSG and HFC in the Aberdeen Sheriff Court which, in 2008, ruled that the sales 
contract had been validly rescinded 19 and, notably, that Mr Durkin had, under s75(1) 
been entitled to rescind the credit agreement, and awarded him damages of £8,000 
for  injury  to  his  credit,  £6,880  in  extra  interest  incurred  on  the  HFC  debt  and 
£101,794 for the loss of capital gain accruing from his inability to purchase a property 
abroad  as  result  of  his  damaged  credit  file.  Perhaps  not  unsurprisingly,  HFC 
appealed on the court’s interpretation of s.75 (1). 
The Inner House 20 (which reversed the earlier decision in respect of loss of interest 
and  loss  accruing  from  his  being  denied  the  opportunity  to  purchase  property 
abroad) determined that s.75 did not permit rescission of a credit agreement, with 
Lord Mackay of Drumadoon opining that in the event of a breach of a supply contract 
“… the statutory provision which is now section 75(1) (and the terms of the 
amendments to it that were debated) were intended to ensure that when a 
debtor has a claim against his supplier he shall have the like claim, in sense 
of  a  similar  claim,  against  the creditor,  who  has lent  funds to  finance the 
contract of  sale,  not a different or distinct  claim against that creditor…had 
Parliament intended that breach of the contract of sale should, of itself, entitle 
the consumer to rescind the credit agreement (or that rescission of the credit 
agreement would automatically occur if the contract of sale were rescinded), it 
would, in our view, have used different language than is to be found in section 
75.”21
So it  was  clear:  the  supply  and  credit  agreements  were  distinct,  and  “joint  and 
several liability” would not extend to the rescission of the credit agreement, but only  
to  enable  the  recovery  of  damages  from  a  supplier  (and  from  his  creditor),  to 
19 PC World did not subsequently appeal on this point.
20 Durkin [2010] CSIH 49; 2010 S.C. 662; 2011 S.L.T. 114.
21 Durkin [2010] CSIH 49; 2010 S.C. 662; 2011 S.L.T. 114 at [56]–[59].
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compensate him for loss that he has incurred, or is liable to incur,  by reason of 
present and future obligations under the credit agreement to make payments. 
However, the Supreme Court, whilst agreeing with some elements of Lord Mackay’s 
approach,22 reversed this earlier decision and suggested that rescission of a credit 
agreement  forming  part  of  a  s.12  (b)  transaction  was  appropriate  in  certain 
circumstances, but by a different and less obvious route. Lord Hodge, in delivering 
the only judgment (with  Lady Hale,  Lords Wilson, Sumption and Reed agreeing) 
postulated that–
“It  is  inherent  in  a  debtor-creditor-supplier  agreement  under  s.12(b)  of  the 
1974 Act, which is also tied into a specific supply transaction, that if the supply 
transaction which it financed is in effect brought to an end by the debtor’s 
acceptance of the supplier’s repudiatory breach of contract, the debtor must 
repay the borrowed funds which he recovers from the supplier. In my view, in 
order to reflect that reality, the law implies a term into such a credit agreement 
that it is conditional upon the survival of the supply agreement. The debtor on 
rejecting the goods and thereby rescinding the supply agreement for breach 
of contract may also rescind the credit agreement by invoking this condition.”23
This  clearly  indicates  a  fundamental  shift  in  interpretation:  whilst  the  court  
acknowledged that the Inner House had been correct in its analysis of s.75 per se, 
and this provision would not offer rescission where such was not already available 
under  the  general  law,  it  concluded  that  Mr  Durkin  could  rescind  the  credit 
agreement based upon the common law implied term, where the supply agreement 
has already been rightfully rescinded for  breach of contract,  be this a breach of  
implied  or  express  terms.   Such  a  right  to  rescind  a  related  credit  agreement 
represents more than a nuanced amendment to established legal authority and goes 
well beyond the remedy of damages envisaged by the Crowther Committee Report24 
–  albeit  at  a  quantum  to  include  losses  incurred  in  complying  with  any  credit 
agreement which, Lord Hodge confirmed, would not “extinguish his debt until either it  
was upheld by the court or the creditor agreed to cancel the debt”,25 a position which 
would be generally unsatisfactory to the debtor. The reality would now appear to be 
that where there exists a s.12(b) agreement, rescission of the credit agreement is 
facilitated by common law principles and not s.75, although as Lord Hodge stated 
“the  result  is  the  same  but  the  mechanism  more  simple”.26 The  practical 
consequences of this approach are that where a s.12(b) transaction is underpinned 
by a credit card purchase, the implication of such a term will not entitle the debtor to  
rescind the entire credit card agreement, only that part of the credit facility used to 
make  the  purchase.  Of  course,  the  position  is  different  should  the  instrument 
22 Durkin [2014] UKSC 21; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 1148; [2014] 2 All E.R. 715 at [19].
23 Durkin [2014] UKSC 21; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 1148; [2014] 2 All E.R. 715 at [26].
24 The Report of the Committee on Consumer Credit (Cmnd.4596, 1971) at [6.6.26–27]. 
25 Durkin [2014] UKSC 21; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 1148; [2014] 2 All E.R. 715 at [22].
26 Durkin [2014] UKSC 21; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 1148; [2014] 2 All E.R. 715 at [28].
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financing the transaction be a loan,  taken for the specific  purchase,  where  such 
could clearly be rescinded in its entirety should circumstances permit. On a similarly 
pragmatic note,  the Supreme Court further  acknowledged27 that  HFC was under a 
duty of care in negligence to Mr Durkin to ensure the credit agreement had not been 
rescinded  (as  he  claimed  it  had  been)  before  reporting  adverse  credit  to  credit  
reference agencies. Their  breach of this duty sounded in damages,  assessed at 
£8,000. To this end, lenders should now take steps to investigate such matters to 
avoid claims from aggrieved debtors whose credit has been compromised and not 
indicate a default until such questions are resolved.
In essence, the connotation of this decision is that even where he has fully complied 
with the numerous and byzantine legislative consumer credit provisions, a creditor 
may not be able to avoid rescission and the inevitable uncertainty over the amount of 
interest he can ultimately claim from the debtor although, as the Crowther Committee 
suggested, it was paramount that the debtor be endowed with certain guaranteed 
contractual rights, particularly so where there was a connected lender and supplier  
“engaged in a joint venture to their mutual advantage”.28 To this end, therefore, the 
Supreme Court has further shifted the balance of protection towards the consumer 
by circumventing the manifest precincts of s.75 through use of the traditional implied 
term, itself a simplistic yet highly effectual tool for reinforcing the raison d'être of the 
Consumer Credit  Act,  namely consumer protection.  This  will  obviate the need to 
seek the sanction of other, less malleable common law principles, such as frustration 
which, according to Lord Hodge, would not assist a debtor “because the creditor will 
have  paid  the  supplier  and  the  purpose  of  the  credit  agreement  will  have  been 
fulfilled by the  purchase of  the  goods,  before the  consumer  rescinds the supply 
contract”29  
27 Durkin [2014] UKSC 21; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 1148; [2014] 2 All E.R. 715 at [33]–[34].
28 The Report of the Committee on Consumer Credit (Cmnd.4596, 1971) at [6.2.24].
29 Durkin [2014] UKSC 21; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 1148; [2014] 2 All E.R. 715 at [25],  Krell v 
Henry [1903] 2 K.B. 740 distinguished.
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